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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
V. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Requiring Past Disposers of Hazardous Wastes to Abate
Resultant Imminent Hazards Under Section 7003 of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
In recent years, the improper disposal of hazardous waste has emerged
as perhaps the nation's most serious environmental problem.' The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)2 represents Congress' first
direct attempt to address the problem of improper disposal of hazardous
waste.3 The RCRA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
1. See Hazardous Waste Disposal, Our Number One Environmental Problem: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). No distinct concept of the magnitude
of the hazardous waste problem exists. See Special Report to Congress, INJURIES AND DAAcES
FROM HAzARaous WAsTE: ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, IN COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 301(e) OF TBE CoMPREHENsIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 BY THE "SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP" Vols. I & II, 1,
reprinted as Comm. Print for the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, serial No. 97-12,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Limitations in scientific testing procedures, a lack of information
about the chemical properties of combinations of hazardous substances and a lack of under-
standing of the effects of human exposure to hazardous wastes have created substantial scientific
uncertainty about the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem. Id. at 8-9, 12-16. The absence
of records concerning the substances disposed of and the location of disposal sites renders the
evaluation of the hazardous waste problem even more difficult. Id. at 7, 10-11.
In 1979, manufacturers produced 173,500,000 tons of hazardous chemicals. S. RaP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). At that time, production of hazardous chemicals was
growing at a rate of 3.5%o per year. Id. As of February, 1981, the EPA was discovering
hazardous waste disposal sites at a rate of 400 per month. See Using RCRA 's Imminent Hazard
Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 EcOL. L. Q. 599, 600 n.3 (1981).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982)).
3. See Wolf, Hazardous Waste Trials and Tribulations, 13 ENvTL. L. 367, 368 (1983)
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was Congress' first direct attempt to regulate
hazardous waste). Prior to the enactment of the RCRA, the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965
and the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 addressed solid waste disposal in general, but did not
specifically address hazardous waste disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 3251(b)(2) (1970) (Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965); 42 U.S.C. § 3251(b) (1982) (Resource Recovery Act of 1970); see also
Kovacs and Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COL. J. ENvTL. L., 205, 212-16 (1977) (discussion
of history of federal solid waste legislation).
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, which made incineration and aquatic disposal
more costly, provided a stimulus to increased land disposal of hazardous wastes. See Andersen,
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. REv.
633, 635, 646; 33 U.S.C. § 1252 et seq. (1982) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
(1982) (Clean Air Act). Congress enacted the RCRA to remedy the problem of unregulated
land disposal of hazardous wastes and other substances which Congress perceived as the last
remaining loophole in environmental law. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4-
5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238, 6241-42. Since the RCRA's passage
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establish minimum safety standards for generation, storage, treatment, trans-
portation and disposal of hazardous waste. 4 Section 7003 of the RCRA is
an imminent hazard provision which addresses the situation in which haz-
ardous wastes present an impending risk to public health or the environment.5
Section 7003 permits the Administrator of the EPA to obtain an injunction
to restrain persons from contributing to the handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of wastes in ways which present an imminent
in 1976, however, the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem has revealed itself as far
greater than Congress had anticipated. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 6119, 6120 [hereinafter cited as
Superfund Report]. The discovery of the serious health problems of residents of Niagara Falls,
New York as a result of the residents' exposure to hazardous wastes at the abandoned Love
Canal disposal site provided Congress with the impetus first to amend the RCRA and eventually
to enact the Superfund legislation. See id. at 6121 (Love Canal hazard as impetus to Superfund);
SUBCOMN1'TEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HousE CoiMUrTEE ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAzARDous WASTE DISPOSAL REPORT, (H.R. Comm. Print No. IFC
31), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 32 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Eckhardt Report] (Love Canal
hazard was impetus for RCRA amendments). The Superfund legislation created a fund financed
by the federal government and those sections of industry whose wastes contribute significantly
to the hazardous waste disposal problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). The fund compensates
federal and state governments for clean-up activities in cases in which the governments are
unable to locate the responsible parties, or in which the parties do not have the resources to
perform the clean-up. See id. § 9611(c)(2). Although Congress recognized that section 7003 of
the RCRA applies to inactive dump sites, in enacting Superfund, Congress wanted to provide
a means to remedy imminent hazards at disposal sites for which the EPA could locate no
financially responsible owner. See Superfund Report, supra at 6125; infra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text (discussion of section 7003 of RCRA).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923-6925 (1982) (statutes concerning generation, storage, treatment,
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes under RCRA).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982) [hereinafter referred to as § 7003 of RCRA]; see Using
RCRA "s Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 ECOL. L. Q. 599, 600
(1981) (§ 7003 of RCRA is imminent hazard provision). In addition to the RCRA, three other
environmental statutes which include imminent hazard provisions are the Safe Drinking Water
Act, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 300; (1982) (imminent hazard
provision of Safe Drinking Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982) (imminent hazard provision of
Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1982) (imminent hazard provision of Clean Air Act).
The House Committee Report on the Safe Drinking Water Act details the meaning of the
imminent hazard provision. See H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6454, 6487-88. The report states that the
Environmental Protection Agency may bring suit to abate a danger to public water supplies
when the risk of harm is imminent, without waiting until the harm itself is imminent. Id. at
6487-88. Because of the preventive nature of the imminent hazard provision, courts should give
consideration to the time necessary for pursuing abatement of the danger through the judicial
system when evaluating the imminence of the hazard. Id. at 6488. The term "substantial" in
the phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment" refers to the size of the risk as well as
the amount of harm. Id. at 6487. A substantial likelihood of harm to health is sufficient to
permit an injunction under the Safe Drinking Water Act's imminent hazard provision. Id. at
6488.
In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the predecessor of the
Clean Water Act's imminent hazard provision, which permitted the EPA to bring suit to obtain
abatement of pollution originating in one state which was endangering public health or welfare
in another state. See 514 F.2d 492, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane); 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(1)
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hazard to health or the environment. 6 In addition, section 7003 authorizes
the Administrator to take other necessary action to protect public health and
the environment.7 Under the authority of section 7003, the EPA has brought
suits to require parties responsible for the creation of an imminent hazard
to remedy the hazard.8 Frequently, however, the hazard is discovered after
the voluntary disposal of wastes has ceased. 9 In United States v. Waste
Industries,0 the Fourth Circuit recently considered whether section 7003
authorizes courts to require persons who have ceased dumping activities
before the hazard arises to remedy the resultant imminent hazard."
In Waste Industries, the defendant, Waste Industries, operated a sanitary
landfill'2 at Flemington in New Hanover County, North Carolina from 1972
to 1979.13 Buried wastes at the landfill leached 4 through the soil to the
(1970), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1982). The Eighth Circuit held that the EPA need
only prove a risk of harm and not actual harm to show endangerment. Reserve Mining Co. v
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit further found that
scientists need not have completely established the relationship between the suspected harmful
agent and the harm for the EPA to seek abatement of the endangerment. Id. The Eighth Circuit
noted, however, that the term "imminent and substantial endangerment" in the later version
of the Clean Water Act connoted a greater risk of harm than the earlier version's term
"endangering." Id. at 528; compare 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1982) (amended version of Clean
Water Act's imminent hazard provision) with 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(1) (1970) (prior version of
Clean Water Act's imminent hazard provision).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982). § 7003 of RCRA provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that
the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in
the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person contributing to such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal, or to take such other action
as may be necessary. The Administrator shall provide notice to the affected State of
any such suit. The Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State, take
other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and the environment.
Id.
7. Id.
8. See Using RCRA 's Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9
EcoL. L. Q. 599, 601 n.9 (1981) (list of 56 suits EPA has filed under RCRA § 7003 as of 1981).
9. Id. at 603.
10. 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
11. See id. at 165 (under § 7003, courts may require persons no longer actively disposing
of hazardous wastes to alleviate imminent hazard which is result of such persons' past conduct).
But see United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1305-14 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (Q 7003
merely permits restraint of affirmative disposal conduct); see infra note 25 and accompanying
text (discussing district court's reasoning on affirmative conduct issue).
12. A sanitary landfill is a dump site in which an earth moving machine compresses
compacted wastes and covers the wastes with soil. See N. SAX, INDUsTRIAL POLLUTION 264
(1974).
13. See 734 F.2d at 162.
14. Leaching involves the percolation of water soluble components downward through
the soil and ultimately into ground water below the disposal site. See W. HONOUR, HONOUR's
ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 64 (1979).
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ground-water aquifer' 5 below the site and infiltrated the Flemington water
supply.' 6 A variety of contaminants in concentrations large enough to harm
persons and the environment reached residental wells.' 7 Upon detecting the
contamination, the EPA advised residents of the serious health risks and
required the County to provide a water system.' s
The EPA brought suit against Waste Industries, seeking restoration of
the ground water to its original condition and reimbursement of the funds
spent on the EPA's investigation of the Flemington landfill.' 9 The EPA
asserted that section 7003 of the RCRA permits a suit to restrain the former
operators of an inoperative dump site from allowing hazardous substances
at that site to continue to pollute water supplies. 20 Waste Industries, however,
contended that the EPA could use the statute only to restrain ongoing
dumping activities. 2' Waste Industries argued that section 7003 does not
empower courts to require persons who have ceased affirmative disposal
activities to eliminate current hazards resulting from past disposal.22 Waste
Industries therefore argued that since the dump was no longer in operation,
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which the court could grant
relief.
21
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina granted Waste Industries' motion to dismiss the complaint. 24 Fol-
lowing standard rules of statutory interpretation, the district court determined
that the statute permits injunctions to restrain only active human conduct. 2
15. A groundwater aquifer is an underground repository consisting of earth, gravel or
porous rock, which holds water. See id. at 10, 53.
16. See 734 F.2d at 162. At the time the contamination in Waste Industries occurred, the
town of Flemington had no centralized water system. Id. at 162-63. Residents obtained water
from individual wells. Id.
17. Id. at 162. In Waste Industries the contaminants found in residential wells included
tetrachloroethylene, benzene, trichloroethylene, 1, 2-dichloroethane, vinyl chloride, methylene
chloride, and lead. Id. The contaminants created a substantial risk of cancer and an unacceptably
high risk of neurological damage to children. Id.
18. Id. at 162-63.
19. Id. at 163. In Waste Industries, in addition to seeking reimbursement and decontam-
ination of the ground water underlying Flemington, the EPA sought a plan for preventing
additional contamination of Flemington water supplies. Id. The EPA also requested that the
court require Waste Industries to monitor the contaminated site. Id. The EPA abandoned its
original request that the court require the defendants to provide a permanent source of safe
water for Flemington residents when residents obtained a water system with federal, state, and
local funds. Id.
20. Id. at 161.
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 161. In Waste Industries, the defendants moved to have the court dismiss the
EPA's claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 556 F. Supp. at
1301; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim upon
which court can grant relief).
24. See 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1319 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
25. See Id. The district court in Waste Industries used the ejusdem generis and noscitur
a socils rules of statutory interpretation to interpret the term "disposal" within § 7003. Id. The
rule of ejusdem generis interprets general words following specific words in a statute to include
1985]
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The district court further discussed whether, assuming section 7003 applied
to situations in which past conduct created a present danger, the statute
provided any substantive standards for imposing liability.
26 The district court
determined that section 7003 does not establish standards for the imposition
of liability on persons responsible for creating an imminent hazard.
27 The
court found that section 7003 simply gives federal courts jurisdiction over
actions to enjoin persons from contributing to an imminent waste hazard.
2
Moreover, the district court stated that the federal common law of public
nuisance 9 could not provide the necessary substantive standards of liability
for an imminent hazard because the RCRA had preempted federal common
law in the area of hazardous waste disposal.
30
Finally, the district court determined that the imposition of liability on
persons who complied with the laws in effect at the time such persons
deposited wastes would amount to a retroactive application of the RCRA.
3 '
The court contrasted section 7003 with provisions of Superfund.
3 2 The
Superfund legislation, which Congress passed in 1980, explicitly imposes
liability for dumping of hazardous wastes which occurred prior to the passage
only objects similar to those that the specific words include. Id. at 1305 n.7. The district court
concluded that Congress intended the general term "disposal" to refer only to active human
conduct, because "disposal" follows handling, storage, treatment and transportation in § 7003,
and the latter four terms refer specifically to active human conduct. Id. at 1305. The rule of
noscitur a sociis directs a court to interpret the meaning of an ambiguous term in accordance
with other words in the same grouping. Id. Therefore, the district court in Waste Industries
interpreted the ambiguous term "disposal" in light of the element of affirmative conduct
common to handling, storage, treatment and transportation. Id. But see United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982) (term "disposal" under RCRA is not ambiguous because
term's definition within RCRA leaves no doubt concerning meaning of "disposal").
26. 556 F. Supp. at 1314-16.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-07 (1972) (courts may fashion
federal common law pertaining to public nuisances to fill interstices in federal pollution laws
where overriding federal interest exists in uniform rule of decision).
30. 556 F. Supp. at 1315-16. The Waste Industries district court found that the RCRA
had preempted the common law of public nuisance based on the Supreme Court's holding in
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois that the enactment of amendments to the Clean Water Act made
the Act a comprehensive regulatory scheme and thus preempted the federal common law. Id.;
see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981); Federal Water Pollution Control
(Clean Water) Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (amendments to Clean
Water Act). According to the Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, whether a federal
statutory scheme has preempted federal common law depends on the comprehensiveness of the
scheme and whether the scheme addresses the problem that the common law had previously
controlled. 451 U.S. at 315 n.8.
31. Id. at 1317-18; see infra note 53 and accompanying text (EPA did not promulgate
standards for disposal of hazardous wastes until after Waste Industries' landfill had ceased
operations).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). "Superfund" refers to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. See Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Super-
fund") Act of 1980, 8 COL. J. ENVTL. L., 1, 1 n.1 (1982); supra, note 3 (discussing history of
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of Superfund. 3 The court viewed the expressly retroactive provisions of
Superfund as proof that Congress was capable of spelling out its intent that
a statute have retroactive effect. 34 According to the district court, the absence
of such unequivocal retroactive language in section 7003 of the RCRA
indicated that Congress did not intend section 7003 to impose liability for
dumping activities which occurred prior to the enactment of the RCRA. 35
The district court therefore refused to apply section 7003 to require the
defendants to take action to abate the hazard.
3 6
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
remanded the case. 37 The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had
interpreted section 7003 too narrowly. 3 The Fourth Circuit explained that
the inclusion of the term "leaking" in the Act's definition of "disposal"
indicated that Congress did not intend to require active human conduct as a
prerequisite to suit under section 7003. 39 Consequently, persons who depos-
ited wastes prior to the effective date of the RCRA can be liable if that past
conduct is responsible for an imminent hazard caused by post-RCRA leakage
of those wastes.40
In response to the defendants' contention that section 7003 permits an
federal regulation of hazardous waste).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
34. 556 F. Supp. at 1318. In addition to finding that the lack of explicit language regarding
retroactivity in § 7003 implies that Congress did not intend § 7003 to be retroactive, the Waste
Industries district court discussed the implications of the enactment of Superfund for § 7003.
1d. at 1316-17. Since Superfund authorizes the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste disposal
sites, the district court concluded that Congress enacted Superfund because § 7003 of the RCRA
does not apply to inactive sites. See id. But see Superfund Report, supra note 3, at 6125 (House
report on Superfund recognizes that § 7003 of RCRA applies to sites where past dumping has
resulted in imminent hazard).
35. 556 F. Supp. at 1318.
36. Id.
37. See 734 F.2d at 168.
38. Id. at 163.
39. 734 F.2d at 164. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1982). The RCRA defines "disposal" as
"the discharge, leaking or placing of any solid waste or hazardous wastes into or on any land
or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters."
Id. The legislative history of § 7003 is sparse. See United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery,
Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143 (N.D. Ind. 1980). The sole contemporaneous congressional report
on the RCRA does not explain the imminent hazard provision. See H.R. RP. No. 1491, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 6238, 6309; see also
Kovacs and Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COL. J. EmrL. L., 205, 216-20 (1977) (chronicling
development and passage of RCRA in final days of 1976 congressional session); Using RCRA 's
Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 EcoL. L. Q. 599, 604 n.21
(1981) (discussing likely reasons for Congress' lack of explanation of § 7003 when RCRA's
development was in progress). Subsequent congressional interpretations of § 7003 exist, however,
and such interpretations are an appropriate source of information concerning the meaning of
the statute. See infra notes 45 & 75 (courts appropriately defer to subsequent congressional
interpretation of statutes).
40. 734 F.2d at 165.
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injunction only under emergency conditions, the Fourth Circuit stated that
the language of the section permits an action against the operator of a dump
when the disposal creates a substantial imminent hazard. 4' The court noted
that the Third Circuit in United States v. Price42 similarly had held that a
risk of harm was sufficient to permit the EPA to bring suit under section
7003. 43 The Fourth Circuit also addressed the defendants' claim that section
7003 was solely jurisdictional and provided no substantive basis for the
imposition of liability upon persons responsible for creating an imminent
hazard. 4 Based on a House subcommittee report issued pursuant to Congress'
consideration of amendments to the RCRA (the "Eckhardt Report"), the
Fourth Circuit found that section 7003 imposes substantive liability upon
persons who create an imminent hazard and additionally gives courts juris-
diction over actions brought to abate impending danger from hazardous
waste disposal. 4 - The Eckhardt Report states that section 7003 essentially
codified the common law of public nuisance by incorporating common-law
theories assigning liability for the creation of a public nuisance." Since
section 7003 incorporates common-law theories, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
41. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982).
42. 688 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1982). In Price, the EPA sought from the defendants a
study of the danger to Atlantic City's wells and an alternative source of water for residents
whose wells were contaminated by the leakage of hazardous waste from a landfill in Pleasantville,
New Jersey. Id. at 207-09. The defendants in Price had ceased dumping chemical wastes at the
site in 1972, prior to the enactment of the RCRA. Id. at 208. Although the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief, the Third Circuit disapproved
the lower court's restrictive interpretation of § 7003. See id. at 211; 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1067-
68 (D.N.J. 1981). The Price court discussed § 7003 in response to the district court's conclusion
that federal courts could not grant relief by decreeing that a defendant in a suit under § 7003
pay funds to abate an imminent hazard. See 688 F.2d at 211-14; 523 F. Supp. at 1068. The
Third Circuit found that pursuant to § 7003, courts may order persons who ceased dumping
prior to the enactment of the RCRA to clean up hazardous waste disposal sites which present
an imminent danger. 688 F.2d at 214. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of
such a remedy in this case, however, because the Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion by
the district court. Id. at 211. The Third Circuit noted that the government had joined as
defendants in the action only a few of the persons responsible for the creation of the hazard.
Id. Based on the unfairness of requiring those few to expend the large sums necessary to abate
the hazard, and the danger to the public if the defendants proved financially unable to bear the
burden, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the EPA's cleanup and subsequent
reimbursement provided a better solution in this case. Id.
43. See 734 F.2d at 165; 688 F.2d at 211 (§ 7003 and similar provision of the Safe
Drinking Water Act authorize injunctive relief where only risk of harm is present); supra note
5 (discussing imminent hazard provisions in environmental statutes).
44. 734 F.2d at 167; see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing substantive
or jurisdictional nature of § 7003).
45. See 734 F.2d at 167; Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 31; Seatrain Shipbuilding
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (reports of subsequent congressional interpre-
tation of statute provide authority for statutory interpretation in absence of pertinent legislative
history).
46. See Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 31; supra notes 29 & 30 (federal common law
of public nuisance fills interstices of federal environmental statutes).
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that section 7003 contains common-law standards of liability for the creation
of imminent hazards.
47
As a consequence of the finding that section 7003 incorporates the
common law of public nuisance, the Fourth Circuit criticized the trial court's
holding that the RCRA preempted the federal common law of nuisance .
4
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois9 had cautioned against courts' use of common-law
principles to decide cases in areas that Congress had preempted through the
enactment of comprehensive statutory schemes, the Fourth Circuit empha-
sized that nothing prohibited Congress from incorporating the common law
into such a statutory framework. Since the Eckhardt Report indicates that
section 7003 embodies the common law of public nuisance, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that proper application of the statute requires courts to
enjoin parties responsible for the creation of a common-law public nuisance,
when that nuisance constitutes an imminent hazard.5'
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the defendants' contention that the
suit was an impermissible retroactive application of the RCRA since the
EPA had not adopted regulations controlling the disposal of hazardous and
solid wastes until after the Flemington landfill had ceased operation.5 2 The
Fourth Circuit stated that the applicability of section 7003 did not depend
on the adoption of regulations since the statute provided a remedy not for
improper disposal procedures, but rather for results of disposal presenting
substantial risks of harm.5 3 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that
section 7003 became operative as soon as Congress enacted the statute.
5 4
The predominant disagreement between the Fourth Circuit and the
district court concerned whether courts may apply section 7003 in the absence
of ongoing affirmative disposal of hazardous wastes.5 5 Several other courts
47. See 734 F.2d at 167.
48. See id.; supra note 30 (discussing preemption of federal common law of public
nuisance by environmental legislation).
49. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
50. 734 F.2d at 167; see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1981) (federal
courts lack authority to impose restrictions beyond those which Congress has enacted in
comprehensive regulatory scheme).
51. See 734 F.2d at 167-68; Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 31 (§ 7003 embodies
common law of public nuisance).
52. See 734 F.2d at 167-68. The landfill in Waste Industries ceased operations in 1979.
See waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1303. Although Congress enacted the RCRA in 1976, the
EPA did not promulgate the standards that the RCRA called for until 1980. See 734 F.2d at
167-68.
53. 734 F.2d at 164, 168. In Waste Industries, the Fourth Circuit contrasted the RCRA's
Subtitle C which applies to persons handling hazardous wastes with § 7003, which is within a
separate subtitle of the RCRA concerning environmental endangerment. Id. The Fourth Circuit
viewed § 7003's placement within the RCRA as evidence that § 7003 deals with the effect of
disposal practices, not the way in which persons dispose of wastes. Id. The cessation of active
disposal prior to the EPA's promulgation of disposal regulations, therefore, is immaterial to
liability under § 7003. Id.
54. Id.
55. Compare 734 F.2d at 164-67 (courts may apply § 7003 to require defendants no longer
1985]
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have addressed this question.5 6 For example, in United States v. Solvents
Recovery Service of New England,.7 the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut held that the EPA need not allege continuing affirm-
ative disposal to state a claim under section 7003 upon which the court could
grant relief.58 The defendants in Solvents Recovery Service had ceased any
affirmative acts of disposal prior to the time EPA sought an injunction.
5 9
The Solvents Recovery Service court stated that section 7003 does not
differentiate between present hazards due to continuing acts and hazards due
to acts which have ceasedA0 Therefore, the district court held that the EPA's




The Third Circuit United States Court of Appeals also addressed the
question of whether ongoing dumping is a prerequisite for obtaining abate-
ment of an imminent hazard under section 7003 in United States v. Price.
62
Although the Third Circuit's interpretation of section 7003 in Price was
dictum, the Third Circuit's discussion of the issue is helpful in interpreting
the statute. 63 Like the Fourth Circuit in Waste Industries, the Third Circuit
actively disposing of waste to abate imminent hazard resulting from past disposal) with 556 F.
Supp. at 1305-14 (ongoing affirmative disposal of hazardous wastes is prerequisite to application
of § 7003).
56. See United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127,
1139-41 (D. Conn. 1980) (§ 7003 does not require ongoing conduct); infra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text (discussion of Solvents Recovery Service); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d
204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982) (§ 7003 can apply to dormant site), affirming United States v. Price,
523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (§ 7003 permits courts to require defendants to take
steps to stop leaking that results from passive inaction); infra notes 62-65 (discussion of Price);
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1435-37 (S. D. Ohio 1984) (§ 7003 applies to present
leaking resulting from past, pre-RCRA actions); United States. v. Reilly Tar and Chemical
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-09 (D. Minn. 1982) (refusing to hold that § 7003 cannot apply
to persons whose connection with the dump ceased prior to the enactment of RCRA when such
persons sold site); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 789-91 (E.D. Pa. 1982) § 7003
does not apply to nonnegligent persons who formerly generated hazardous waste and contracted
for waste's disposal at site other than where generation occurred); Untied States v. Midwest
Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 144-45 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (court did not discuss
ongoing conduct issue but granted injunction to force cleanup of site no longer in operation).
57. 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
58. Id. at 1139-41.
59. Id. at 1130, 1141. In Solvents Recovery Service, both defendants apparently continued
to dispose of wastes after the enactment of the RCRA by dumping the wastes into unlined
lagoons, or by placing leaky drums of hazardous waste at the disposal site. Id. However, both
defendants had ceased the dumping before the EPA filed the complaint. Id. at 1141.
60. Id. at 1140. See supra note 6 (quoting § 7003). The Solvents Recovery Service court
noted that § 7003 on its face requires only that the disposal present an imminent hazard and
does not require that the disposal be continuing. 496 F. Supp. at 1140.
61. Id. at 1141. The defendants in Solvents Recovery Service had moved to dismiss the
EPA's claim for failure to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief. Id. at 1129;
see FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss claim for failure to state claim upon which
court can grant relief).
62. See 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982); supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text
(discussion of Price).
63. See supra note 42 (Third Circuit in Price discussed meaning of § 7003 in dictum).
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relied on the Eckhardt Report's conclusion that section 7003 may be used in
cases where past events have created a present hazard.6 The Third Circuit
in Price, found that the statutory language of section 7003, together with
the Eckhardt Report, unequivocally authorized cleanup of a dormant site to
eliminate an imminent hazard. 65
The definition of "disposal" within the RCRA provides another basis
for courts' decisions that the application of section 7003 is not limited to
the restraint of ongoing voluntary disposal. 6 The definition of disposal under
the RCRA includes "leaking." 67 Since leaking refers to the escape of a
substance without affirmative human conduct, the RCRA authorizes the
EPA to obtain an injunction against persons whose affirmative conduct has
ceased. 1 Instead of looking directly to the unambiguous statutory definition
of disposal, the district court took a circuitous route, using rules of statutory
construction to interpret the term "disposal. ' 69 In doing so, the Waste
Industries district court arrived at an interpretation of disposal that excludes
waste disposal due to leaking from the purview of section 7003 .70
In addition to contradicting the statutory definition of disposal, the
district court's interpretation of section 7003, which requires ongoing dump-
ing, contradicts statements in the Eckhardt Report. 7' The House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which prepared the 1976 report pub-
lished in lieu of a conference report as the official legislative history of the
RCRA 7 2 was also responsible for the issuance of the Eckhardt Report
64. See 688 F.2d at 213-14; supra note 46 and accompanying text (Eckhardt Report
indicates that § 7003 adopted common law of public nuisance).
65. See 688 F.2d at 213-14.
66. See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (plain wording of
§ 7003 permits restraint of "further disposal, i.e. leaking" (emphasis in original)); see also
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1436 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding Wade and Waste
Industries district court decisions unpersuasive because "leaking" is part of statutory definition
of disposal); supra note 39 (definition of "disposal" under RCRA).
67. See supra note 39 (definition of "disposal" under RCRA).
68. See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (affirmative conduct
is not necessary to sustain action under § 7003 since statutory definition of disposal includes
leaking of wastes); accord, Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1436 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(leaking need not proceed from affirmative conduct). But see United States v. Waste Industries,
556 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 n.10 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (citing United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp.
785, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (term "leaking" in definition of "disposal" refers to structure that
permits waste to leak into dump and does not refer to leakage of wastes into environment).
69. See supra note 25 (discussing Waste Industries district court's use of rules of statutory
construction to interpret meaning of "disposal" in RCRA).
70. See supra note 39 (definition of "disposal" in RCRA and courts' interpretations of
definition).
71. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (Eckhardt Report indicates that courts may
require persons no longer actively disposing of hazardous waste to eliminate resultant imminent
hazard under § 7003).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Navs 6238 (legislative history of RCRA of 1976). No conference committee report exists,
since congress passed the RCRA without sending the bill to a House-Senate conference
committee. See Kovacs & Klucsik, The New Federal Rule in Solid Waste Management: The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 CoL. J. ENVTL. L., 205, 216-20 (1977).
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pursuant to Congress' consideration of the 1980 amendments to the RCRA. 3
The Eckhardt Report refers to the RCRA's imminent hazard provision as
the only tool that the RCRA provides for dealing with past improper
disposal.7 4 The Fourth Circuit correctly observed that when the intent of the
enacting Congress is unclear, a court should give deference to a report such
as the Eckhardt Report which expresses the views of a succeeding Congress.
7 5
The second major difference between the trial and appeals courts'
opinions in Waste Industries concerns the substantive or jurisdictional nature
of section 7003.76 Aside from section 7003, none of the standards in the
RCRA apply to the situation in which past activities eventually result in an
imminent hazard.7 7 Congress presumably contemplated some source of sub-
stantive standards of liability which courts could apply to determine whether
to permit such restraint because section 7003 authorizes the EPA to seek
restraint of persons contributing to the imminent hazard.78 The substantive
standards for section 7003 must exist either within the section itself or within
the common law of nuisance because the substantive standards are not found
elsewhere in the RCRA.79 The statement in the Eckhardt Report that section
7003 incorporates the common law of public nuisance indicates that the
Fourth Circuit in Waste Industries correctly held that section 7003 contains
The House report which serves as the official legislative history provides no interpretation of §
7003. See Using RCRA 's Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 EcOL.
L. Q. 599, 603, 604 (1981) [hereinafter cited as RCRA 's Imminent Hazard Provision]. No other
contemporaneous report on the RCRA exists. See id.
73. See Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 1.
74. See id. at 31. The Eckhardt Report states that Congress intended § 7003 not only to
incorporate the common law of nuisance but also to broaden some of the common-law theories
of liability for the creation of a nuisance. Id. As an example, the report explains that when
someone other than the generator of hazardous waste has disposed of the waste improperly and
the disposal results in an imminent hazard, the EA can obtain an order under § 7003 to
require the generator of the waste to abate the hazard. Id. The district court in Waste Industries
correctly noted that the thrust of the example in the Eckhardt Report is that § 7003 imposes
liability on persons who did not dispose of waste themselves. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1308 (E.D.N.C.
1982). The example of generator liability nonetheless refers to § 7003 as imposing liability for
past dumping. Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 31.
75. 734 F.2d at 166, citing Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572,
596 (1980); see supra note 72 (discussion of RCRA's atypical legislative history).
76. Compare 734 F.2d at 167 (§ 7003 requires courts to expand upon common-law
standards of liability for creation of nuisance) with 556 F. Supp. at 1314-16 (RCRA's preemption
of common law of nuisance and solely jurisdictional nature of § 7003 result in absence of
substantive standards for imposition of liability under § 7003).
77. See Preamble, 45 Fed. Reg. 33, 158 (1980). The House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce criticized the EPA for failing to use § 7003 to attack the problem of inactive
waste disposal sites. See H.R. RaP. No. 191, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1979). Since the Committee
participated in the formulation of RCRA, courts should give deference to the Committee's
view. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U:S. 317, 329-30 (1942) (interpretation
of legislation within five years by committee which promulgated legislation was practically
conclusive in determination of legislation's meaning).
78. Cf. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1434 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (noting dilemma
concerning function of § 7003 if no standards of liability exist in either common law or § 7003).
79. Id. The Jones court criticized the Waste Industries district court for failing to explain
the function of § 7003 if no source of substantive standards of liability exists. Id.
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substantive standards of liability. 0 Conversely, the district court's holding
that section 7003 was solely jurisdictional and that the common law of
nuisance was no longer available as a source of substantive standards because
of preemption by the RCRA contradicts both the Eckhardt Report and case
law from other federal courts.8'
The retroactivity of section 7003 is the third major area of disagreement
between the district and appellate courts.12 The district court held that the
use of section 7003 to require persons who have ceased dumping to eliminate
the resultant imminent hazard would be an impermissible retroactive appli-
cation of the RCRA.83 The Fourth Circuit, however, held that no retroactivity
was involved because the defendants had continued dumping after the
enactment of the RCRA. The Waste Industries district court's failure to
discuss the defendants' continued operation of the Flemington landfill after
the enactment of the RCRA and the court's failure to state that the EPA
did not promulgate regulations under the RCRA until after the defendants
closed the landfill, renders the court's retroactivity rationale unclear.85 The
80. See Eckhardt Report, supra note 3, at 31.
81. See 556 F. Supp. at 1315-16; supra note 30 (discussing preemption of federal common
law of nuisance by federal environmental legislation); supra note 46 and accompanying text
(Eckhardt Report states that § 7003 embodies common law of nuisance); United States v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., No. C80-1857, slip op. (N. D. Ohio May 29, 1981) reprinted in 17
EVr'T. REP. CASES 1329, 1332 (1981) (§ 7003 does not simply grant jurisdiction over actions to
enjoin persons from contributing to imminent waste hazard but also provides substantive law
for imposition of liability upon such persons); accord Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp.
1425, 1435 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (§ 7003 is both substantive and jurisdictional). But see United
States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D. Conn. 1980) (§ 7003 is
solely jurisdictional but substantive standards derive from common law); United States v.
Midwest Solvent Recovery, 484 F. Supp. 138, 144 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (§ 7003 would extend
liability far beyond common-law nuisance liability if broad wording of § 7003 were substantive,
therefore § 7003 is solely jurisdictional and substantive standards derive from common law).
One court which has not ruled explicitly on the issue of the substantive or jurisdictional
nature of § 7003 has granted an injunction under the section. See United States v. Vertac
Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980). Other courts have indicated that such
relief would be available in an appropriate case. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214-
15 (3d Cir. 1982) (grant of injunction to require past disposers to clean up dormant disposal
site was within power of district court); United States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1110 (D. Minn. 1982) (refusing to dismiss § 7003 complaint) The holdings in
Price and Reilly Tar imply that the courts found some source of substantive standards of
liability, either within § 7003 or from the federal common law of public nuisance. See Price,
688 F.2d at 214-15; Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1110.
82. See supra notes 31-36 (discussion of Waste Industries district court's analysis of §
7003 regarding retroactive application of statute); 734 F.2d at 167-68 (Waste Industries case
presents no retroactivity problem because defendants continued affirmative disposal after
enactment of RCRA).
83. 556 F. Supp. at 1317.
84. 734 F.2d at 167-68.
85. See 556 F. Supp. at 1317-18. The district court's retroactivity argument in Waste
Industries appears to be simply a restatement of the court's conclusion that ongoing acts of
disposal are a prerequisite to actions under § 7003. See id. (district court's retroactivity
discussion); id. at 1312 (district court's discussion of ongoing dumping as prerequisite to action
under § 7003). The district court's statement that the cleanup that the EPA sought would
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district court may have considered that section 7003 was not effective prior
to the EPA's promulgation of regulations under the RCRA. s6 The Fourth
Circuit's position is that section 7003 did not require regulations to render
the section effective because the applicable standards of liability already
existed within the common law.8 7 Section 7003 therefore became effective as
soon as Congress enacted the RCRA.88 Since the defendants in Waste
Industries engaged in affirmative disposal after the enactment of the RCRA,
the case presented no retroactivity problem. 9
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Waste Industries is well-reasoned on the
issues of the applicability of section 7003 to past dumping and the source of
substantive standards of liability for the creation of an imminent waste
hazard. The decision also is in accord with case law from other jurisdictions
and would appear to follow the few existing indications of legislative intent
regarding section 7003. 91 The holding of the Fourth Circuit in Waste Indus-
impose liability retroactively for actions which complied with laws in effect at the time of the
dumping demonstrates a focus on the defendant's conduct which is inconsistent with nuisance
law. 556 F. Supp. at 1317; see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF nsm LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed.
1971). The focus in nuisance law is on the result of the defendant's conduct, not the conduct
itself. Prosser, supra at § 87; see United States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F. Supp. 1127,
1140 (D. Conn. 1980) (section 7003 addresses existence rather than cause of imminent hazard).
86. Compare 556 F. Supp. at 1317-18 (Waste Industries district court referred to imposition
of liability through EPA regulations as a retroactive application of the RCRA) with 734 F.2d
at 167-68 (Fourth Circuit explained that EPA promulgated RCRA regulations after Waste
Industries dump had ceased operating). See supra note 52 (landfill in Waste Industries closed
after enactment of RCRA, but prior to EPA's promulgation of regulations under RCRA).
87. See 734 F.2d at 167-68.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 168. Like the defendants in Waste Industries, one defendant in United States
v. Solvents Recovery Service had ceased dumping after the enactment of the RCRA, but prior
to the EPA's promulgation of regulations under the RCRA. See United States v. Solvents
Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D. Conn. 1980). The Solvents
Recovery Service court refused to dismiss the EPA's claim under § 7003. Id. at 1144. Similarly,
in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., despite the defendant's cessation of dumping
prior to the enactment of the RCRA, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the
EPA's claim for abatement of the- imminent hazard under § 7003. See United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn. 1982).
90. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1434-36 (S.D. Ohio 1984). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio decided Jones two weeks prior to the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Waste Industries, following very similar reasoning. See id. 734 F.2d
at 159, 164-67. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Jones court interpreted the Eckhardt Report's
statement that § 7003 incorporates common-law theories of liability to mean that § 7003 contains
substantive standards of liability. Compare 584 F. Supp. at 1434 with 734 F.2d at 167
(substantive standards of § 7003 derive from common law but are incorporated within § 7003).
The Jones court also independently arrived at the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit
regarding the applicability of § 7003 to past dumping. Compare 584 F. Supp. at 1435-36 (based
on definition of "disposal" within RCRA and recognition by subsequent Congress that § 7003
applies to dormant disposal sites, Jones court concluded that ongoing affirmative disposal was
not prerequisite to suit under § 7003) with 734 F.2d at 164-66 (definition of "disposal" and
subsequent Congressional interpretation show that § 7003 applies to dormant sites).
91. See supra notes 56, 68, 71-74 & 82 and accompanying text (both case law and
indications of legislative intent support Fourth Circuit's analysis of § 7003 in Waste Industries).
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